INDIA’S FIRST (FAILED) SECULAR ALLIANCE-3
एक दुखी परिवार – २०
Rajput invasions and internal rebellions
Rana Sanga, the Hindu Rajput leader of Mewar (1509–1526) had risen to be the leaeder among the sveral kings of Rajputana. During his rule Mewar reached the pinnacle of its glory, gaining recognition as the most eligible Hindustani who would arrest muslim expansionist designs, though his immediate muslim rival Lodi did not enforce his clergy into the then Indian community, for the Lodi kingdom had other challenges to meet. Mixing up of religion was not perceived as a tool to sustain the rule or to promote expansionist interests.
The Rana had expanded his kingdom, dealing setbacks to Lodi whose kingdom with Delhi as its centre suffered in multi pronged manner, especially in protecting its routes that trade and commerce required essentially.
Thereby, the Rana was acknowledged by all the Rajput clans as the leading prince of Rajputana.
On the other hand, Daulat Khan, the governor of Babur had the effect of uprooting the Lodi Dynasty.
New weapon, the matchlock musket.
Babur was swift in acquiring this new technology. Babur introduced matchlocks into his army, and allowed an Ottoman, Ustad Ali, to train his troops, who were then known as Matchlockmen, in their use.
Babur's memoirs give accounts of battles where the opposition forces mocked his troops, never having seen a gun before, because of the noise they made and the way no arrows, spears, etc. appeared to come from the weapon when fired.
These guns allowed small armies to make large gains on enemy territory. Small parties of skirmishers who had been dispatched simply to test enemy positions and tactics, were making inroads into India.
Babur, however, had survived two revolts, one in Kandahar and another in Kabul, and was careful to pacify the local population after victories, following local traditions and aiding widows and orphans.
Babur’s this gesture accounted for his acceptance at the ground level, as the subjects wanted stability, irrespective of the religious faith to which the ruler belonged. Though no name was ascribed to this gesture which Babur practiced as a strategy, due to compulsion rather than compassion, it was that materially and substantially which grew into a concept called SECULARISM.
This was more true about the Delhi throne, for twin reasons.
Firsly, it had conditioned itself to muslim rulers.
Secondly, the Rajputs who represented themselves as Hindus, propounding their faiths as rival to the muslims, did not bring about anything pragmatic at the grass roots level, save and except fierce inter and intra-party clashes. People thus stood confused as regards the matwrial implication of religion vis a vis their life, living ad livlihood.
It had trickled down to the ground level by default that Babur fought Sultan Ibrahim because he wanted Sultan Ibrahim’s power and territory.
They did not fight against each other because of religious faith as did Rajputs, as the Rajputs had then projected.
Babur and Sultan Ibrahim were both Sunni Muslims, hence their fight strengthened belief at the lowest ebb that religion had little role to play in the acquisition of power by the power of sword, better say ,gun powder in the changed context .
Sultan Ibrahim was at a disadvantage, not only because of his out-moded infantry, but also the inter-necine rivalries. Even though he had more men, Sultan Ibrahim had never fought in a war against gunpowder weapons.
Mahmud Lodi
Ibrahim Lodi's brother , Mahmud Lodi declared himself Sultan and continued to resist Mughal forces. He provided 10,000 Afghan soldiers to Rana Sanga in battle of Khanwa. After the defeat, Mahmud Lodi fled eastwards and again posed a challenge to Babur two years later at the Battle of Ghaghra.
Babur rallies his troops
According to Babur, Rana Sanga's army consisted of 200,000 soldiers--probably a rough guess, according to Lane-Poole Even if this figure is exaggerated, Chandra comments that it is indisputable that Sanga's army greatly outnumbered Babur's forces. The greater numbers and reported courage of the Rajputs served to instill fear in Babur's army. An astrologer added to the general unease by his foolish predictions.
To raise the flagging morale of his soldiers, Babur proceeded to renounce future consumption of wine, broke his drinking cups, poured out all the stores of liquor on the ground, and promulgated a pledge of total abstinence.
He also made his nobles and soldiers take an oath on the Koran that they would fight to the death. In his autobiography, Babur writes that:
It was a really good plan, and it had a favorable propagandistic effect on friend and foe.
The battle
The Battle of Khanwa took place at Khanwa, near Fatehpur-Sikri, on 16 March, 1527. Before the battle, Babur had carefully inspected the battle site. Like in Panipat, he strengthened his front by procuring carts which were then fastened by iron chains (not leather straps as at Panipat) in the Ottoman fashion. These were used for providing shelter to horses and for storing artillery. Gaps between the carts were used for horsemen to charge at the opponent at an opportune time. To lengthen the line, ropes built of raw hide were placed over wheeled wooden tripods. Behind the tripods, matchlockmen were placed who could fire and, if required, advance. The flanks were given protection by digging ditches. In addition to the regular force, small contingents were kept apart on the left flank and in front for the tulghuma(flanking) tactic. Thus, a strong offensive-defensive formation had been prepared by Babur. Rana Sanga, fighting in a traditional way, attacked the mughal army's flanks. He was prevented from breaking through by reinforcements dispatched by Babur. Once the advance of the Rajputs and their Afghan allies had been contained, Babur's flanking tactic came into play. The carts and matchlockmen were ordered to advance, hemming in the the Rajputs and their allies. Despite putting up a gallant fight, Rana Sanga and his allies suffered a disastrous defeat. Following his victory, Babur ordered a tower of enemy skulls to be erected--a practice formulated by Timur against his adversaries, irrespective of their religious beliefs. The objective of constructing a tower of skulls was not just to record a a great victory, but also to terrorize opponents. Earlier, the same tactic had been used by Babur against the Afghans of Bajaur.
Aftermath
The Battle of Khanwa demonstrated that Rajput bravery was not enough to counter Babur's superior generalship and organizational skills.
Babur himself commented:
Swordsmen though some Hindustanis may be, most of them are ignorant and unskilled in military move and stand, in soldierly counsel and procedure.
This statement, made in the context of the Afghans, was equally applicable to the Rajputs . Rana Sanga managed to evade capture and escape to Chittor, but the grand alliance he had built collapsed.
The powerful confederacy which depended so largely for its unity upon the strength and reputation of Mewar, was shattered by a single defeat and ceased henceforth to be a dominant factor in the politics of India that was Hindustan, as per Babur.
On 30th January,1528, Rana Sanga died in Chittor--apparently poisoned by his own chiefs who held his plans of renewing the fight with Babur to be suicidal.
(Cont. )
एक दुखी परिवार – २०
Rajput invasions and internal rebellions
Rana Sanga, the Hindu Rajput leader of Mewar (1509–1526) had risen to be the leaeder among the sveral kings of Rajputana. During his rule Mewar reached the pinnacle of its glory, gaining recognition as the most eligible Hindustani who would arrest muslim expansionist designs, though his immediate muslim rival Lodi did not enforce his clergy into the then Indian community, for the Lodi kingdom had other challenges to meet. Mixing up of religion was not perceived as a tool to sustain the rule or to promote expansionist interests.
The Rana had expanded his kingdom, dealing setbacks to Lodi whose kingdom with Delhi as its centre suffered in multi pronged manner, especially in protecting its routes that trade and commerce required essentially.
Thereby, the Rana was acknowledged by all the Rajput clans as the leading prince of Rajputana.
On the other hand, Daulat Khan, the governor of Babur had the effect of uprooting the Lodi Dynasty.
New weapon, the matchlock musket.
Babur was swift in acquiring this new technology. Babur introduced matchlocks into his army, and allowed an Ottoman, Ustad Ali, to train his troops, who were then known as Matchlockmen, in their use.
Babur's memoirs give accounts of battles where the opposition forces mocked his troops, never having seen a gun before, because of the noise they made and the way no arrows, spears, etc. appeared to come from the weapon when fired.
These guns allowed small armies to make large gains on enemy territory. Small parties of skirmishers who had been dispatched simply to test enemy positions and tactics, were making inroads into India.
Babur, however, had survived two revolts, one in Kandahar and another in Kabul, and was careful to pacify the local population after victories, following local traditions and aiding widows and orphans.
Babur’s this gesture accounted for his acceptance at the ground level, as the subjects wanted stability, irrespective of the religious faith to which the ruler belonged. Though no name was ascribed to this gesture which Babur practiced as a strategy, due to compulsion rather than compassion, it was that materially and substantially which grew into a concept called SECULARISM.
This was more true about the Delhi throne, for twin reasons.
Firsly, it had conditioned itself to muslim rulers.
Secondly, the Rajputs who represented themselves as Hindus, propounding their faiths as rival to the muslims, did not bring about anything pragmatic at the grass roots level, save and except fierce inter and intra-party clashes. People thus stood confused as regards the matwrial implication of religion vis a vis their life, living ad livlihood.
It had trickled down to the ground level by default that Babur fought Sultan Ibrahim because he wanted Sultan Ibrahim’s power and territory.
They did not fight against each other because of religious faith as did Rajputs, as the Rajputs had then projected.
Babur and Sultan Ibrahim were both Sunni Muslims, hence their fight strengthened belief at the lowest ebb that religion had little role to play in the acquisition of power by the power of sword, better say ,gun powder in the changed context .
Sultan Ibrahim was at a disadvantage, not only because of his out-moded infantry, but also the inter-necine rivalries. Even though he had more men, Sultan Ibrahim had never fought in a war against gunpowder weapons.
Mahmud Lodi
Ibrahim Lodi's brother , Mahmud Lodi declared himself Sultan and continued to resist Mughal forces. He provided 10,000 Afghan soldiers to Rana Sanga in battle of Khanwa. After the defeat, Mahmud Lodi fled eastwards and again posed a challenge to Babur two years later at the Battle of Ghaghra.
Babur rallies his troops
According to Babur, Rana Sanga's army consisted of 200,000 soldiers--probably a rough guess, according to Lane-Poole Even if this figure is exaggerated, Chandra comments that it is indisputable that Sanga's army greatly outnumbered Babur's forces. The greater numbers and reported courage of the Rajputs served to instill fear in Babur's army. An astrologer added to the general unease by his foolish predictions.
To raise the flagging morale of his soldiers, Babur proceeded to renounce future consumption of wine, broke his drinking cups, poured out all the stores of liquor on the ground, and promulgated a pledge of total abstinence.
He also made his nobles and soldiers take an oath on the Koran that they would fight to the death. In his autobiography, Babur writes that:
It was a really good plan, and it had a favorable propagandistic effect on friend and foe.
The battle
The Battle of Khanwa took place at Khanwa, near Fatehpur-Sikri, on 16 March, 1527. Before the battle, Babur had carefully inspected the battle site. Like in Panipat, he strengthened his front by procuring carts which were then fastened by iron chains (not leather straps as at Panipat) in the Ottoman fashion. These were used for providing shelter to horses and for storing artillery. Gaps between the carts were used for horsemen to charge at the opponent at an opportune time. To lengthen the line, ropes built of raw hide were placed over wheeled wooden tripods. Behind the tripods, matchlockmen were placed who could fire and, if required, advance. The flanks were given protection by digging ditches. In addition to the regular force, small contingents were kept apart on the left flank and in front for the tulghuma(flanking) tactic. Thus, a strong offensive-defensive formation had been prepared by Babur. Rana Sanga, fighting in a traditional way, attacked the mughal army's flanks. He was prevented from breaking through by reinforcements dispatched by Babur. Once the advance of the Rajputs and their Afghan allies had been contained, Babur's flanking tactic came into play. The carts and matchlockmen were ordered to advance, hemming in the the Rajputs and their allies. Despite putting up a gallant fight, Rana Sanga and his allies suffered a disastrous defeat. Following his victory, Babur ordered a tower of enemy skulls to be erected--a practice formulated by Timur against his adversaries, irrespective of their religious beliefs. The objective of constructing a tower of skulls was not just to record a a great victory, but also to terrorize opponents. Earlier, the same tactic had been used by Babur against the Afghans of Bajaur.
Aftermath
The Battle of Khanwa demonstrated that Rajput bravery was not enough to counter Babur's superior generalship and organizational skills.
Babur himself commented:
Swordsmen though some Hindustanis may be, most of them are ignorant and unskilled in military move and stand, in soldierly counsel and procedure.
This statement, made in the context of the Afghans, was equally applicable to the Rajputs . Rana Sanga managed to evade capture and escape to Chittor, but the grand alliance he had built collapsed.
The powerful confederacy which depended so largely for its unity upon the strength and reputation of Mewar, was shattered by a single defeat and ceased henceforth to be a dominant factor in the politics of India that was Hindustan, as per Babur.
On 30th January,1528, Rana Sanga died in Chittor--apparently poisoned by his own chiefs who held his plans of renewing the fight with Babur to be suicidal.
(Cont. )
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